Provably Beneficial AI

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United Kingdom Plans $1.3 Billion Artificial Intelligence Push

France to spend $1.8 billion on AI to compete with U.S., China

EU wants to invest £18bn in AI development

China’s Got a Huge Artificial Intelligence Plan
Eventually, AI systems will make better* decisions than humans

- Taking into account more information, looking further into the future
Upside

- Access to significantly greater intelligence would be a step change in civilization
- NPV (HLAI) ≈ $13,500T
Downside
'Killer Robots' could be outlawed

'Killer Robots' could be made illegal if campaigners in Geneva succeed in persuading a UN committee, meeting on Thursday and Friday, to open an investigation into their development
Robots Could Replace Half Of All Jobs In 20 Years

By Timothy Torres, Tech Times | March 24, 6:56 PM

If we’re to believe University of Oxford associate professor Michael Osborne, then robots will replace 47 percent of all jobs by the year 2035.

If you want to stay employed by then, you better think about a career shift into software development, higher level management or the information sector. Those professions are only at a 10 percent risk of replacement by robots, according to Osborne. By contrast, lower-skilled jobs in the accommodation and food service industries are at a 87 percent risk, transportation and warehousing are at a 75 percent risk and real estate at 67 percent. The researcher warns that driverless cars, burger-flipping robots and other automatons taking over low-skilled jobs is the way of the future.
Artificial Intelligence could spell the end of the human race

BY PAUL CROKE · JUNE 9, 2015 · NO COMMENTS
Where did we go wrong?

- **Humans** are intelligent to the extent that *our* actions can be expected to achieve *our* objectives
- **Machines** are intelligent to the extent that *their* actions can be expected to achieve *their* objectives
  - Give them objectives to optimize (cf control theory, economics, operations research, statistics)
- We don’t want machines that are intelligent in this sense
- **Machines** are *beneficial* to the extent that *their* actions can be expected to achieve *our* objectives
- We need machines to be *provably beneficial*
Three simple ideas

1. The robot’s only objective is to maximize the realization of human preferences
2. The robot is initially uncertain about what those preferences are
3. The source of information about human preferences is human behavior*
AIMA 1,2,3: objective given to machine

Human objective

Human behaviour

Machine behaviour
AIMA 1,2,3: objective given to machine

Human objective

Machine behaviour
AIMA 4: objective is a latent variable

Human objective

Human behaviour ───────────────────────────── Machine behaviour
Example: image classification

- Old: minimize loss with (typically) a \textit{uniform} loss matrix
  - Accidentally classify human as gorilla
  - Spend millions fixing public relations disaster
- New: structured prior distribution over loss matrices
  - Some examples safe to classify
  - Say “don’t know” for others
  - Use active learning to gain additional feedback from humans
Example: fetching the coffee

- What does “fetch some coffee” mean?
- If there is so much uncertainty about preferences, how does the robot do anything useful?
- Answer:
  - The instruction suggests coffee would have higher value than expected a priori, ceteris paribus
    - and there’s probably a low-cost way to get it
  - Uncertainty about the value of other aspects of environment state doesn’t matter as long as the robot leaves them unchanged
The off-switch problem

- A robot, given an objective, has an incentive to disable its own off-switch
  - “You can’t fetch the coffee if you’re dead”
- A robot with uncertainty about objective won’t behave this way
Theorem: robot has a positive incentive to allow itself to be switched off
Theorem: robot is provably beneficial
Learning from human behavior

- **Inverse reinforcement learning**: learn a reward function by observing another agent’s behavior
  - The reward function is a succinct explanation for what the other agent is doing
- **Cooperative IRL**: two-player game with human and robot
Basic CIRL game

Preferences $\theta$
Acts roughly according to $\theta$

CIRL equilibria:
Human teaches robot
Robot asks questions, permission; defers to human; allows off-switch

Maximize unknown human $\theta$
Prior $P(\theta)$
Example: paperclips vs staples

- State \((p,s)\) has \(p\) paperclips and \(s\) staples
- Human reward is \(\theta p + (1-\theta)s\) and \(\theta = 0.49\)
- Robot has uniform prior for \(\theta\) on \([0,1]\)

\[\begin{array}{c}
\text{H} \\
\text{R} [2,0] \quad \text{R} [1,1] \quad \text{R} [0,2] \\
\text{R} [90,0] \quad \text{R} [50,50] \quad \text{R} [0,90]
\end{array}\]

\([1,1]\) is optimal ($51.00 vs $46.92$)
Extensions

- Efficient CIRL-solving algorithms
  - Palaniappan et al, ICML 18
- Inverse reward design
  - Hadfield-Menell et al, NIPS 17
- Should robots be obedient?
  - Milli et al, IJCAI 17
- Pragmatic-Pedagogic Value Alignment
  - Fisac et al, ISRR 17
Objections

- Carey (2018): $P(\theta)$ might exclude true preferences
  - Need to allow for unknown unknowns
- Armstrong & Mindermann (2017): preferences of non-rational humans are non-identifiable
  - OK, $a=F(\theta)$, cannot identify both $F$ and $\theta$
  - But $F$ has to satisfy some constraints for $\theta$ to count as preferences
One robot, many humans

- Weighing human preferences:
  - Linear and adaptive combinations
  - Welfare aggregation, utility monsters, etc.
  - Somalia problem (vs loyal and law-abiding)
- Avoiding incentives for strategic behavior by humans
- Population IRL, avoiding incentives for strategic behavior by robots
Real(ish) humans

- Computationally limited
  - Hierarchical IRL
  - Boltzmann-rational Variance wrt depth

- Preferences of real humans
  - how would we go about constructing/learning a real model?
  - nasty? zero out negative altruism terms
  - bad behavior? not necessarily a problem
  - relativized to others
  - non-additive, influenced by memory
  - incoherent
  - plastic/adaptive
    - no alternative but to consider how preferences are formed
    - probably essential to avoid preference manipulation by AI
The not-so-great AI debate

- Signs of tribalism (like nuclear, GMO, climate)
- Corporate motivated cognition
- Kelly, Brooks:
  - “intelligence is multidimensional so ‘smarter than a human’ is meaningless”
- Brooks, Pinker:
  - Sufficiently intelligent AI systems cannot fail to recognize that they’re doing things humans are unhappy about
Provably beneficial AI is possible
It should become the norm

- A civil engineer says “I design bridges”, not “I design bridges that don’t fall down”

Look forward to tightly coupled ecosystems of humans and machines

Assuming we develop provably beneficial AI technologies, will people use them?

- Dr. Evil
- Progressive enfeeblement